German Fighter Pilot POW’s Who Praised the RAF Lancaster Bomber and Its .303-Caliber Guns

On December 12, 1944, the RAF dispatched 140 Lancaster bombers along with 90 escort Mustangs on a daylight mission aimed at a steel works plant in Witten, Germany. The operation was part of a broader campaign by the Allies to strike industrial targets and disrupt enemy production. The Lancaster bombers, known for their size and heavy payload, were expected to carry out their mission with precision while relying on their defensive firepower.

During the raid, the bomber formations came under attack by 20 German fighter aircraft, specifically Me 109 models. In the ensuing combat, eight of the 140 Lancaster bombers were shot down by the German fighters. The loss rate was noted to be significantly higher than that of the American heavy bomber fleet during the same period. This discrepancy in losses highlighted differences in formation tactics and fighter coverage, and it raised questions about the vulnerability of the Lancaster formation during daylight operations.

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The Interrogation of a German Fighter Pilot POW

Three weeks after the raid, a German fighter group commander was shot down and captured. During his interrogation by USAAF and RAF personnel, he provided detailed accounts of the engagement. His debriefing, recorded in a declassified Air Intelligence Weekly document dated March 11, 1945, offers a rare view into the tactics and opinions held by German pilots at the time. He described how his unit, which consisted of 20 Me 109 G4s, was tasked with intercepting the Lancaster formations as they approached their target.

The interrogated commander spoke at length about the performance of the Lancaster bomber, particularly praising its use of .303-caliber machine guns. According to his account, the bombers were armed with eight Browning machine guns – two in the nose turret, two in the top turret, and four in the tail turret. These guns were loaded with armor-piercing rounds, and their rate of fire was recorded at around 1,200 rounds per minute. He compared the effectiveness of these guns with heavier calibers, expressing surprise that such relatively light armaments could provide a measure of protection against fighter attacks. His observations also touched on the formation tactics used by the RAF, noting that the spacing between the bombers allowed German fighters to target individual aircraft with relative ease.

Technical and Tactical Insights

The RAF had developed a combat box formation for its heavy bombers, which allowed multiple aircraft to cover each other with interlocking fields of fire. However, the German commander noted that the Lancaster formations during this particular mission were looser than those of American bombers. According to his report, the wider spacing meant that enemy fighters could fly in between the bombers without coming under effective return fire. He mentioned that when a Lancaster left its formation, it became highly vulnerable to attack, a fact he supported by citing intelligence reports on bomber losses. His detailed analysis provided insights into how the bombers’ defensive formations could be improved, suggesting that tighter grouping might reduce losses.

At the same time, the German fighter’s armament was also discussed. The Me 109s in his unit were typically equipped with two MG 131 machine guns, each firing 13 mm rounds, and one or two 20 mm autocannons. He explained that while these weapons had their own effective range limits – around 400 meters for the machine guns and 300 meters for the autocannons – they were sufficient to engage bombers that failed to maintain proper formation. The pilot’s account further revealed that the inherent design of the Lancaster allowed its gunners to cover various angles, yet the loose formation still resulted in higher losses than expected.

Reflections on the Lancaster and Its Armament

During the interrogation, the captured German commander offered a critical view of the RAF’s bomber tactics. He remarked that the Lancaster bombers might have suffered fewer losses if their formations were tighter, similar to the more compact formations used by US heavy bombers. His comments were based on direct observations from his own squadron’s encounters with the Lancasters, as well as from his experience flying multiple sorties against daylight bomber formations. He expressed a degree of respect for the design of the Lancaster, particularly noting that its .303-caliber machine guns, although not as heavy as other armaments, proved to be surprisingly effective in deterring attacks when used correctly.

His detailed report also covered the overall attrition rate during the mission. The RAF loss rate for the Lancasters in that raid was calculated to be several times higher than that experienced by American bombers during similar operations. This discrepancy was attributed to differences in both formation tactics and the degree of fighter protection provided during daylight missions. The German commander’s insights have been preserved in official records and serve as an important resource for understanding the complex dynamics of air combat during World War II.

Throughout his account, the officer maintained a neutral tone, focusing on the technical and tactical aspects of the encounter. His evaluation of the Lancaster and its armaments provides a unique perspective from the enemy’s point of view, one that continues to interest historians and aviation enthusiasts alike.